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Abstract
■ Human communicative competence is based on the ability
to process a specific class of mental states, namely, communica-
tive intention. The present fMRI study aims to analyze whether
intention processing in communication is affected by the expres-
sive means through which a communicative intention is con-
veyed, that is, the linguistic or extralinguistic gestural means.
Combined factorial and conjunction analyses were used to test
two sets of predictions: first, that a common brain network is
recruited for the comprehension of communicative intentions
independently of the modality through which they are conveyed;
second, that additional brain areas are specifically recruited de-
pending on the communicative modality used, reflecting dis-
tinct sensorimotor gateways. Our results clearly showed that a
common neural network is engaged in communicative intention
processing independently of the modality used. This network
includes the precuneus, the left and right posterior STS and
TPJ, and the medial pFC. Additional brain areas outside those
involved in intention processing are specifically engaged by the
particular communicative modality, that is, a peri-sylvian language
network for the linguistic modality and a sensorimotor network
for the extralinguistic modality. Thus, common representation of
communicative intention may be accessed by modality-specific
gateways, which are distinct for linguistic versus extralinguistic
expressive means. Taken together, our results indicate that the
information acquired by different communicative modalities is
equivalent from a mental processing standpoint, in particular,
at the point at which the actorʼs communicative intention has to
be reconstructed. ■
INTRODUCTION
Human communication is a cooperative activity among
social agents who together intentionally construct the
meaning of their interaction. People use communication
as a social action to affect and modify othersʼ mental
states using both linguistic and gestural modalities to this
end. The aim of the present work was to analyze the
neural underpinnings of mental processes on which hu-
man communicative competence is based.
According to the cognitive pragmatics approach (Bara,
2010) and the mentalist view of communication (Airenti,
2010; Adenzato & Bucciarelli, 2008; Tirassa, 1999; Grice,
1975), human communicative competence is based on
the ability to recognize and to process a specific kind of
mental state, that is, communicative intention. The phi-
losophy of language and cognitive pragmatics defines
communicative intention as the intention to communicate
a meaning to someone else, plus the intention that the
former intention should be recognized by the addressee
(Bara, 2010; Airenti, Bara, & Colombetti, 1993; Grice,
1975). Take, for instance, the example of an agentʼs point-
ing gesture to a bottle near a partner or the agentʼs sentence
“Pass me the bottle.” The partner has to comprehend not
only the semantic content of the gesture or of the sen-
tence but also what the agent is trying to achieve by ex-
pressing that content, namely, that the agent wants the
partner to hand her the bottle (Figure 1A and B).
Communicative intention represents the primary men-
tal state to be dealt with in explaining of other peopleʼs
communicative actions. In contrast to other mental states
(e.g., beliefs or desires) and other kinds of intentions (e.g.,
individual intentions) that can be instantiated by an actor
in isolation, that is, without the need to interact with other
agents, a communicative intention reflects three main re-
quirements: (a) it always occurs in the context of a social
interaction with a partner; (b) it is overt, in the sense that
it is intended to be recognized as such by the partner; and
(c) its fulfillment consists precisely in the fact that it is rec-
ognized by the partner.
The process whereby this form of intentions can be
understood draws a connection between human commu-
nication and a more general type of social competence,
namely, the theory of mind (ToM) ability (Baron-Cohen,
1995). ToM is defined as the ability to understand and
to predict other peopleʼs behavior by attributing indepen-
dent mental states to them. Neuroimaging studies have
shown the existence of a distributed neural system under-
lying ToM that includes, at least, the complex formed by
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the posterior STS (pSTS) and by the adjacent TPJ areas,
the precuneus, and the medial pFC (MPFC) (Carrington
& Bailey, 2009; Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009).
As highlighted by Frith and Frith (2006), although in
recent years the neural correlates of ToM for individual
mental states such as beliefs and desires have become an
active area of research (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Becchio,
Adenzato, & Bara, 2006; Brune & Brune-Cohrs, 2006; Saxe,
Carey, & Kanwisher, 2004), relatively few studies
have specifically investigated intention processing in com-
munication. A study by Kampe, Frith, and Frith (2003) fo-
cused on the early stages of communicative interactions
and examined the effects of the comprehension of two
signals that convey an intention to communicate, namely,
looking directly at someone and calling someoneʼs name.
An analysis restricted to ToM ROIs showed activations of
the MPFC and of the left temporal pole for both types of
communicative signals, whereas only hearing oneʼs own
name also activated the right temporal pole. It must be
noted that the intention to communicate investigated by
this study differs from communicative intention as defined
earlier, in that here a communicative interaction between
agents is only put forward by the actor but has not actually
taken place. A further study by Wang, Lee, Sigman, and
Dapretto (2006) used a high-level pragmatic aspect of com-
munication, such as irony comprehension, to examine
the neural circuitry involved in inferring the intention be-
yond the literal meaning of an ironic remark. The adults
and the children participating in the study viewed cartoon
drawings while listening to a short story ending with a
Figure 1. Examples of the four experimental conditions of the story completion task. Two intentional conditions, that is, LCInt (A) and
XLCInt (B), and two nonintentional conditions, that is, LPhC (C) and XLPhC (D). Each story consisted of a development phase, followed by
a response phase.
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potentially ironic remark. The authors found that in com-
prehending ironies, adults and children engaged similar
overall brain networks, including the frontal, temporal, and
occipital cortices bilaterally. Furthermore, children recruited
left inferior frontal regions more strongly than adults and
showed reliable activity in the MPFC, whereas adults did
not. In contrast, adults activated posterior occipito-temporal
regions more strongly than children.
In previous studies (Walter et al., 2009; Ciaramidaro et al.,
2007; Walter et al., 2004), we proposed a model consisting
of a dynamic intention processing network (IPN), in which
the right and left pSTS, the right and left TPJ, the precu-
neus, and the MPFC are progressively recruited depending
on the nature of the intention processed, from individual in-
tention to communicative intention. In two separate fMRI
experiments, using a story completion task presented
in comic strip form, we demonstrated that activation of
the whole IPN only emerged during communicative inten-
tion processing, when two characters were depicted in a
communicative interaction mediated by extralinguistic
gestures (e.g., showing a map to ask for directions). In
contrast, the activation of the network was limited to the
right pSTS/TPJ and precuneus when a character was
shown acting with an individual intention (e.g., changing
a broken light bulb to read a book) or when two charac-
ters were shown acting each with their own individual in-
tention (e.g., one character putting some bait on a fishing
hook and the other character lying on a beach chair to
sunbathe).
An important limitation of our previous IPN model is
that it was based on the extralinguistic gestural modality
alone. Starting from our previous data, a central issue re-
mains open, that is, whether the IPN is specifically re-
cruited by gestural communication or is independent of
the communicative modality used.
A Priori Experimental Hypotheses
The present study aims to analyze whether intention pro-
cessing is affected by the modality, linguistic or gestural,
through which a communicative intention is conveyed. Fol-
lowing a cognitive pragmatics approach (Bara, 2010), we
assumed that a common communicative competence—
independent of the linguistic or extralinguistic gestural
means—is instantiated at the level in which a communi-
cative intention is inferred and comprehended within a
specific social context, that is, at the pragmatic level. Con-
sequently, we hypothesized that there is no difference in
brain activity between the recognition of a communicative
intention issued by an observed linguistic behavior and
the recognition of a communicative intention issued by an
observed gestural behavior.
The present study tested two sets of predictions by
using combined factorial and conjunction analyses. First,
that at the pragmatic level, a common brain network, that
is, the IPN, is recruited for the comprehension of commu-
nicative intentions independently of the modality through
which they are conveyed, that is, by language or gesture.
Second, that additional brain areas other than those in-
volved in the IPN at the pragmatic level are specifically re-
cruited depending on the modality used. In particular, we
expect the recruitment of a peri-sylvian language network
for the linguistic modality and of a sensorimotor network
for the extralinguistic gestural modality. These two predic-
tions were addressed by means of a 2 × 2 factorial design,
with factors Intention (intentional vs. nonintentional) and
Modality (linguistic vs. extralinguistic), where the most
crucial question of whether the communicative intent is
processed differently in the linguistic and gestural modal-
ities is reflected in the Intention × Modality interaction.
METHODS
Participants
Twenty-four healthy Italian native speakers (13 women;
age range = 19–37 years, mean = 24.45 years, SD =
5.71 years) with no history of neurological or psychiatric
diseases participated in the imaging study. The Ethics Com-
mittee of the San Raffaele Scientific Institute approved the
study. All participants gave their written informed consent
before scanning. All the participants were right-handed.
Handedness (cutoff ≥ 20/24, score range = 20–24, mean =
23.08, SD= 1.06) was assessed with the Edinburgh Hand-
edness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971).
Stimuli
The experiment consisted of an event-related fMRI study
with a 2 × 2 factorial design. The factors manipulated
were Intention (two levels: intentional vs. nonintentional)
and Modality (two levels: linguistic vs. extralinguistic). This
factorial design resulted in the following four experimental
conditions:
(1) Linguistic communicative intention (LCInt) conveyed
by linguistic means (i.e., sentences presented in writ-
ten form).
(2) Extralinguistic communicative intention (XLCInt) con-
veyed by gestural means (i.e., communicative gestures
presented in pictorial form).
(3) Linguistic physical causality (LPhC) established among
objects, where the causal link is described by a sen-
tence (presented in written form).
(4) Extralinguistic physical causality (XLPhC) established
among objects, where the causal link is depicted in
the scene.
Experimental Conditions 1 and 2 (LCInt and XLCInt)
represented the intentional levels, whereas Conditions 3
and 4 (LPhC and XLPhC) represented the nonintentional
levels of the Intention factor.
We used a story completion task that was presented in
comic-strip form. During scanning, participants were asked
to demonstrate their comprehension of the stories by
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choosing the most appropriate story endings. The ex-
perimental protocol comprised 22 comic strip stories for
each of the four experimental conditions (for a total of
88 stories), which depicted the behaviors of the characters
and the movements of the objects (Figure 1). The stories
were administered in randomized order. Four different
training stories, one for each condition, were also adminis-
tered. Further, examples of comic strips for each condition
are available at http://www.psych.unito.it/csc/pers/enrici/pdf/
com_int_protocol.pdf.
Each story consisted of three consecutive pictures (de-
velopment phase), followed by a choice between two
concluding pictures (response phase).
In the development phase, the first and the second
pictures established a story setting and introduced the
characters or the objects involved, whereas the third pic-
ture represented the communicative intention or phys-
ical causality events. It is important to note that in all of
the stories, the causation (intentional or nonintentional)
could not be univocally inferred before the appearance of
the third picture. This picture determined the linguistic
versus extralinguistic Modality factor. For instance, in
the third picture of an intentional condition story, an ac-
tor says “Please sit down” (LCInt) or indicates a chair
(XLCInt) to a partner located in front of him.
In the response phase, the correct picture represented
a probable and congruent effect resulting from the devel-
opment phase, whereas the incorrect picture represented
an improbable or incongruent effect. For instance, in the
intentional conditions, the correct picture represented the
partnerʼs probable and congruent response to the com-
municative action proposed by the actor (e.g., the partner
sits on the chair) and required the correct attribution of
the actorʼs communicative intention. The incorrect pic-
ture represented an incongruent response to the com-
municative action (e.g., the partner leaves the room).
In all the experimental conditions, each story was re-
peated twice, once for the linguistic and once for the ex-
tralinguistic modality version. Special attention was paid
to the fact that only the third picture of each story—the
communicative modality—differed between the two ver-
sions, whereas the first and the second pictures—the con-
text and the communicative intention associated to it in
the intentional conditions—remained the same. Each par-
ticipant underwent four functional scanning sessions, and
the second presentation of every story was circumscribed
only to the Sessions 3 and 4. Because a possible limitation
of our experimental protocol could have been a potential
repetition effects on brain activations, we arranged the ex-
perimental setting taking into account four dimensions:
the number of repetitions, the time between repetitions,
the number of intervening stimuli, and the kind of repeti-
tion (Grill-Spector, Henson, & Martin, 2006). We had a sin-
gle stimulus repetition (all stimuli were presented only
twice), a mean of approximately 16 min between the first
and the second stimulus presentation, a mean of 44 inter-
vening stimuli of different sorts between the two presenta-
tions (with also three pauses among the scanning sessions
of at least two min each), and a nonidentical (partial)
repetition (i.e., the third picture of each story differed
between the two modality versions), respectively. Fur-
thermore, to control for any potential repetition spurious
effects that could engender a misinterpretation of our
activation patterns (such as a verbal bias for processing
a story in the gestural modality when the same story had
already been observed in the linguistic modality), we firstly
analyzed neuroimaging data only of the first two sessions
(for a total of 44 stories), which did not include any repeti-
tions of the stimuli. No important differences were found
in brain activation between the analysis including only the
first two sessions and the analysis here reported including
all four sessions.
It is important to underline that, as opposed to previous
related works, the development and the response phases
were combined to form a communicative exchange in its
entirety with a communicative action performed by the
actor and the concurrent reaction to that action by the
partner. Furthermore, the depicted behaviors were never
unusual or pretended, and we did not explicitly instruct
our participants to pay attention to the actorsʼ intentions.
Regarding the linguistic modality, we used simple and
direct linguistic communication acts (Bara, 2010; Austin,
1962). Sentences used in the stimuli were controlled for
number of words and occurrence of content words, that
is, nouns and verbs in Italian contemporary written texts
(CoLFIS database; Laudanna, Thornton, Brown, Burani, &
Marconi, 1995). Number of words and standard devia-
tion for the linguistic experimental conditions were as fol-
lows: LCInt, mean = 4.22, SD= 0.85; LPhC, mean = 3.96,
SD= 0.71 (t = 1.100, p= .283). To depict communicative
intentions in the extralinguistic modality, we used conven-
tional ideational gestures, in particular emblem gestures,
that is, meaningful gestures that have a meaning in the ab-
sence of speech (Kendon, 2004; McNeill, 1992).
The experimental protocol was initially administered
without any fMRI scanning in a pilot study (n = 26) to
ensure an equal level of complexity (in terms of accuracy
and RTs) across the four experimental conditions. Re-
sponse accuracy (number of correct answers, maximum
score = 22) and RTs in milliseconds (for correct an-
swers only) as well as standard deviations for the re-
spective conditions were as follows: LCInt, 21.12 (SD =
0.86) and 1394 msec (SD = 248 msec); XLCInt, 21 (SD =
1.17) and 1421 msec (SD = 301 msec); LPhC, 21.31
(SD = 1.12) and 1449 msec (SD = 265 msec); XLPhC,
21.31 (SD = 1.16) and 1459 msec (SD = 277 msec). RTs
more than 2.5 standard deviations from each participantʼs
condition means were excluded from the statistical analy-
sis. There was no significant condition effect on response
accuracy (repeated measures ANOVA), F(3, 75) = 1.27,
p = .292, and on RTs (repeated measures ANOVA), F(3,
75) = 2.53, p = .064.
Stimuli in the fMRI setting were presented in a random-
ized order by means of Presentation 11.0 (Neurobehavioral
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Systems, Albany, CA) and viewed via a back-projection
screen located in front of the scanner and a mirror
placed on the head coil. The presentation was also used
to record behavioral responses that were collected via a
fiber-optic response box.
MRI Data Acquisition
MRI scans were acquired on a 3-T Intera Philips body
scanner (Philips Medical Systems, Best, NL) using an
eight-channel sense head coil (sense reduction factor = 2).
Whole-brain functional images were obtained with a T2*-
weighted gradient-echo, echo-planar sequence, using
BOLD contrast. Each functional image comprised 30 con-
tiguous axial slices (4 mm thick), acquired in interleaved
mode, and with a repetition time of 2000 msec (echo
time = 30 msec, field of view = 240 × 240 mm, matrix
size = 128 × 128). Each participant underwent four func-
tional scanning sessions. The duration of each session was
155 scans, preceded by five dummy scans that were dis-
carded before data analysis. A field map to be used for
the unwarping of echo-planar image spatial distortions
was acquired for each subject before functional scanning.
We also acquired a high-resolution whole-brain struc-
tural T1-weighted scan (resolution = 1 × 1 × 1 mm)
of each participant. The normalized structural images of
all participants were then averaged in one single image
for anatomical localization and visualization of brain
activations.
Data Analysis
Statistical parametric mapping (SPM5; Wellcome Depart-
ment of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK) was used
for image realignment and unwarping, unified segmen-
tation and normalization to the Montreal Neurological
Institute standard space, smoothing by an 8-mm FWHM
Gaussian kernel, and general linear model statistical anal-
ysis. We adopted a two-stage random-effects approach to
ensure generalizability of the results at the population
level (Penny & Holmes, 2003).
First-level General Linear Models
At the first stage, the time series of each participant was
high-pass filtered at 128 sec and prewhitened by means
of an autoregressive model AR(1). Evoked responses for
all experimental conditions were modeled as a set of he-
modynamic response functions, including the canonical
response function and its first and second derivative
functions. The first-level individual design matrices in-
cluded the data of all four scanning sessions. For each
session, we modeled the four experimental conditions
(LCInt, XLCInt, LPhC, and XLPhC) with the onset of the
hemodynamic response functions time locked to the pre-
sentation of the first picture of each story and an epoch
duration covering the entire development phase and the
response phase until button press. A set of Studentʼs t test
contrasts were defined for use at the second statistical
level: These consisted of one contrast per experimental
condition per hemodynamic response function (canonical,
first derivative, and second derivative) for each participant.
Second-level General Linear Models
At the second stage of analysis, the contrast images ob-
tained at the single-subject level were used to compute
a full-factorial ANOVA assessing their significance at the
group level (n = 24 participants). The two within-subject
factors Intention and Modality (equal variance, levels not
independent) were entered in this ANOVA, reflecting the
experimentʼs factorial design, plus an additional within-
subject “Basis set” factor (unequal variance, levels not in-
dependent) with three levels (canonical hemodynamic
response function, first derivative, and second derivative).
The contrasts assessed at the second level included the fol-
lowing: (a) main effect of Intention: [(LCInt + XLCInt) −
(LPhC + XLPhC)]; (b) main effect of Modality: [(LCInt +
LPhC) − (XLCInt + XLPhC)]; and (c) Intention × Modal-
ity interaction: [(LCInt− XLCInt)− (LPhC− XLPhC)]. We
also computed the four simple main effects: [LCInt −
LPhC]; [XLCInt − XLPhC]; [LCInt − XLCInt]; and [LPhC −
XLPhC]. In addition, we also computed null hypothesis
conjunction effects (Nichols, Brett, Andersson, Wager, &
Poline, 2005) between (a) the two simple main effects of In-
tention: [(LCInt− LPhC) conj. (XLCInt− XLPhC)]; and (b)
the two simple main effects of Modality: [(LCInt − XLCInt)
conj. (LPhC − XLPhC)].
We assessed all these group-level effects with F con-
trasts, allowing to make combined inferences over the ca-
nonical hemodynamic response function and its first and
second derivates. All reported effects relate to voxel-level
statistics ( p< .05, family-wise error [FWE] type correction)
on the basis of the Gaussian random field theory, see
Worsley et al., 1996). For all the contrasts listed earlier,
we inspected the corresponding beta estimates to investi-
gate the directionality of the observed differences in activa-
tion and to exclude spurious effects driven by a difference
in the hemodynamic response derivative functions.
Commonalities between the Present Study and
the Study of Walter et al. (2004) (Small Volume
Correction Procedure)
To directly compare the results of the present study with
the results of our previous study (Walter et al., 2004), we
used a small volume correction procedure ( p < .05, FWE
corrected) that restricted the brain voxel-wise analysis to a
functional mask, including the voxels of significant activa-
tion for communicative intention in the previous contrast
(XLCInt > XLPhC in the study by Walter et al., thresh-
olded at p < .05, FWE corrected).
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Table 1. Activations at p < .05, FWE Corrected for Multiple Comparisons
Region Hem
(LCInt + XLCInt) > (LPhC + XLPhC) (LPhC + XLPhC) > (LCInt + XLCInt)
k x y z Z k x y z Z
A. Main Effect of Intention
Superior medial frontal gyrus/MPFC L/R 816 −6 54 32 7.72
Middle temporal gyrus/TPJ assigned to
IPC (PGp), probability: 40%
L 12,302 −52 −64 20 >8
Superior temporal gyrus/TPJ R – 56 −46 20 >8
Superior temporal gyrus/pSTS L – −58 −50 16 >8
Middle temporal gyrus/pSTS R – 54 −64 12 >8
Precuneus L/R 2026 2 −56 40 >8
Superior frontal gyrus R 77 20 46 44 6.29
Middle frontal gyrus R 367 44 40 12 >8
Inferior frontal gyrus (pars orbitalis) L 184 −44 28 −12 >8
Inferior frontal gyrus (pars triangularis)
assigned to Area 45, probability: 60%
L – −54 24 4 6.8
Inferior frontal gyrus (pars triangularis)
assigned to Area 45, probability: 60%
R 112 56 28 4 >8
Supplementary motor area assigned to
Area 6, probability: 70%
L/R 55 −4 8 68 6.18
Middle temporal gyrus L 12,302 −58 −16 −20 >8
R – 60 −8 −24 >8
Inferior temporal gyrus R – 50 −2 −44 >8
R – 46 −46 −24 >8
Medial temporal pole R – 52 8 −32 >8
Cuneus assigned to Area 18,
probability: 50%
R 100 14 −100 12 >8
Superior occipital gyrus assigned to
Area 17, probability: 80%
L 71 −8 −102 8 7.74
Frontal orbital gyrus L 72 −24 32 −20 6.53
R 110 20 34 −20 >8
Superior frontal gyrus L 225 −20 4 56 >8
R 41 26 2 48 5.43
Middle frontal gyrus L 387 −42 36 20 >8
R 367 44 40 12 >8
Inferior frontal gyrus (pars opercularis)
assigned to Area 44, probability: 60%
L 639 −50 6 24 >8
Inferior frontal gyrus (pars opercularis)
assigned to Area 44, probability: 40%
R 126 52 8 24 6.84
Insula R 121 42 0 4 6.95
Supramarginal gyrus assigned to IPC (PFt),
probability: 60%
L 3311 −60 −26 32 >8
Supramarginal gyrus assigned to IPC (PFt),
probability: 30%
R 12,302 64 −20 36 >8
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Table 1. (continued )
Region Hem
(LCInt + XLCInt) > (LPhC + XLPhC) (LPhC + XLPhC) > (LCInt + XLCInt)
k x y z Z k x y z Z
Superior parietal lobule assigned to
SPL (7A), probability: 50%
L 3311 −20 −64 52 >8
Superior parietal lobule assigned to
SPL (7A), probability: 90%
R 12,302 20 −58 64 >8
Inferior temporal gyrus L – −54 −58 −8 >8
R – 56 −52 −12 >8
Fusiform gyrus L – −30 −56 −12 >8
Fusiform gyrus assigned to area
hOC4v (V4), probability: 60%
L – −22 −82 −12 >8
Fusiform gyrus R – 32 −48 −12 >8
Lingual gyrus assigned to area
hOC3v (V3v), probability: 80%
R – 22 −78 −8 >8
Lingual gyrus assigned to Area 17,
probability: 100%
R – 8 −86 −8 >8
Superior/middle occipital gyrus L 3311 −24 −70 36 >8
R 12,302 26 −68 44 >8
Middle cingulate cortex assigned to
SPL (5Ci), probability: 50%
L 3311 −14 −28 40 >8
Middle cingulate cortex assigned to
SPL (5Ci), probability: 50%
R 44 16 −28 40 6.22
Middle cingulate cortex L/R 158 −2 4 32 >8
B. Comparison between Main Effect of Intention and Walter et al. (2004)
Superior medial frontal gyrus/MPFC L/R 57 −6 56 28 6.68
Middle temporal gyrus/pSTS L 127 −54 −50 16 >8
R 9 56 −42 4 >8
Superior temporal gyrus/TPJ L 127 −58 −46 20 >8
Middle temporal gyrus/TPJ assigned to
IPC (PGa), probability: 60%
R 12 60 −60 20 >8
Precuneus R/L 90 0 −56 40 >8
Inferior frontal gyrus (pars orbitalis) R 13 52 32 −8 5.54
Middle temporal gyrus L 21 −54 −4 −24 >8
R 2 52 0 −28 >8
Inferior temporal gyrus R 6 56 −18 −20 >8
Medial temporal pole L 8 −50 8 −32 7.05
For each activated brain region, we report whether the left (L) or right (R) hemisphere was activated (Hem), cluster size (k), Montreal Neurological
Institute space coordinates in millimeters (x,y,z), and Z score (Z ). LCInt = linguistic communicative intention; XLCInt = extralinguistic communicative
intention; LPhC = linguistic physical causality; XLPhC = extralinguistic physical causality. Where available, we report the name of the anatomical regions
the cytoarchitectonic labels and probabilities according to the SPM Anatomy Toolbox (www.fz-juelich.de/ime/spm_anatomy_toolbox).
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RESULTS
Behavioral Results
Response accuracy (number of correct answers, maximum
score = 22) and RTs in milliseconds (for correct answers
only) as well as standard deviations for the respective
conditions were as follows: LCInt, 21.50 (SD = 0.83) and
1458 msec (SD = 248 msec); XLCInt, 21.20 (SD = 0.77)
and 1521 msec (SD = 301 msec); LPhC, 21.54 (SD =
0.65) and 1460 msec (SD = 265 msec); and XLPhC, 21.62
(SD = 0.57) and 1461 msec (SD = 277 msec). RTs more
than 2.5 standard deviations from each participantʼs con-
dition means were excluded from the statistical analysis
(Ratcliff, 1993). There was no significant condition effect
on response accuracy (repeated measures ANOVA), F(3,
69) = 1.99, p = .124, and on RTs (repeated measures
ANOVA), F(3, 69) = 2.72, p = .051. Therefore, we consid-
ered the four tasks to be equally difficult.
Neuroimaging Results
Intention Factor: Intentional versus Nonintentional
The results of the main effect of Intention, that is, the
intentional conditions (LCInt + XLCInt) against the
nonintentional conditions (LPhC + XLPhC), are shown
in Table 1A. Two distinct patterns of activation clearly
emerged for communicative intention and for physical
causality. The main effect of Intention yielded specific
activations for the intentional conditions in the superior
medial frontal gyrus (MPFC), in the left posterior middle
temporal gyrus, closely corresponding (CC) to the TPJ
region and in the left posterior superior temporal gyrus,
CC to the pSTS region, in the right posterior superior
temporal gyrus, CC to the TPJ and right middle tempo-
ral gyrus, CC to the pSTS, and in the precuneus. Several
other fronto-lateral, temporal, and occipital areas were
also activated, including the pars triangularis of the infe-
rior frontal gyrus, bilaterally (Brodmannʼs area [BA] 45).
In turn, activations specific to the nonintentional con-
ditions were found in a widespread network of areas,
including notably the supramarginal gyrus, the superior
parietal lobule, the fusiform gyrus, the middle cingulate
cortex, all bilaterally, and the pars opercularis of the in-
ferior frontal gyrus, bilaterally (BA 44).
To find the commonalities between the results of the
main effect of Intention with the results of our previous
study (Walter et al., 2004), we used a small volume cor-
rection procedure that restricted the analysis to a mask
including the voxels of significant activation for commu-
nicative intention in the study by Walter et al. (2004).
Overlapping activations with our previous data for the
intentional versus nonintentional conditions were found
in the superior medial frontal gyrus, CC to the MPFC, in
the posterior middle temporal gyri, both on the left (CC
to the pSTS) and right (CC to the pSTS and TPJ) sides, in
the left posterior superior temporal gyrus (CC to the TPJ),
and in the precuneus. Additional common effects were
found in the right inferior frontal gyrus (pars orbitalis), in
the anterior right inferior and bilateral middle temporal
gyri, and in the left medial-temporal pole (Table 1B).
To identify the specific activations for the Intention fac-
tor (intentional vs. nonintentional), independently of the
communicative modality used (linguistic vs. extralinguis-
tic), we also computed a conjunction between the two
simple main effects of Intention, one for each Modality
level. In contrast to the main effect of Intention, the con-
junction analysis should only reveal activations that were
elicited by both simple main effects of Intention. The re-
sults were entirely overlapping with the main effect of
Intention (Figure 2A).
Modality Factor: Linguistic versus Extralinguistic
The result of the main effect of Modality, that is, the lin-
guistic conditions (LCInt + LPhC) against the extralinguis-
tic conditions (XLCInt + XLPhC), is shown in Table 2A
and in Figure 2B. The main effect of Modality was asso-
ciated with widespread activations specific to the linguistic
conditions, notably in the left inferior frontal gyrus (cov-
ering BA 44, see Figure 3, BA 45, and BA 47), in the left
precentral gyrus and in the SMA, in the anterior left in-
ferior and bilateral middle temporal gyri, in the left tem-
poral pole and hippocampus, in the bilateral occipital
cortex, and in the left cerebellum. Specific effects for the
extralinguistic conditions were in turn found in the pars
opercularis of the right inferior frontal gyrus (BA 44, see
Figure 3), the left and right precentral, postcentral, and
supramarginal gyri, in the middle cingulate cortex, and
in the left and right caudate nuclei.
Following the same line of reasoning as for the main
effect of Intention, we also computed a conjunction be-
tween the two simple main effects of Modality. Although
spatially more restricted, the activation patterns for the two
levels of the Modality factor (linguistic vs. extralinguistic)
Figure 2. Activations for Intention, Modality, and Intention × Modality. Significant effects ( p < .05, FWE corrected) are displayed on cortical
renderings and on sagittal (x coordinate level in millimeters) and axial (z coordinate levels in millimeters) slices of the anatomical image of one of the
participants. Color codings for the activations reflect the levels of the 2 × 2 factorial design, as indicated in the rectangle inset (bottom right). (A) Null
conjunction of the two simple main effects of Intention: (LCInt − LPhC) conj. (XLCInt− XLPhC): CInt > PhC (red color scale); (LPhC − LCInt) conj.
(XLPhC − XLCInt): PhC > CInt (blue color scale). (B) Main effect of Modality: L > XL (green color scale); XL > L (yellow color scale). (C) Interaction
Intention × Modality: significant effects in the left superior occipital gyrus and in the right cuneus were specifically elicited in the context of the
linguistic mean (as symbolized by the green frame) by the intentional task only (red color scale). The mean percent signal change for the four
experimental conditions in the left superior occipital gyrus is shown on the right of the axial slices, with the color of the effect size bars indicating the
Intention (CInt vs. PhC) and the color of the 90% confidence intervals indicating the modality (L vs. XL).
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Table 2. Activations at p < .05, FWE Corrected for Multiple Comparisons
A. Main Effect of Modality
Region Hem
(LCInt + LPhC) > (XLCInt + XLPhC) (XLCInt + XLPhC) > (LCInt + LPhC)
k x y z Z k x y z Z
Inferior frontal gyrus (pars triangularis)
assigned to Area 45, probability: 60%
L 348 −50 26 12 5.66
Inferior frontal gyrus (pars triangularis)
assigned to Area 44, probability: 40%
L – −42 12 24 >8
Inferior frontal gyrus (pars orbitalis) L – −46 30 −12 6.69
Precentral gyrus assigned to Area 6,
probability: 40%
L 138 −50 −8 44 >8
Supplementary motor area assigned
to Area 6, probability: 70%
L/R 11 −4 4 68 5.41
Middle temporal gyrus L 1672 −60 −4 −12 >8
R 456 62 −4 −16 >8
Inferior temporal gyrus L 6 −50 −54 −16 5.1
Temporal pole L 1672 −50 16 −24 >8
Hippocampus assigned to
hippocampus (CA), probability: 80%
L 12 −34 −18 −16 5.47
Superior occipital gyrus assigned to
Area 17, probability: 70%
L 1338 −6 −100 8 >8
Lingual gyrus assigned to Area
hOC3v (V3v), probability: 50%
L – −14 −90 −12 >8
Lingual gyrus assigned to Area
hOC3v (V3v), probability: 60%
R – 14 −76 −8 6.13
Calcarine gyrus assigned to Area 18,
probability: 50%
R – 10 −96 12 >8
Cerebellum L 125 −36 −40 −28 >8
Inferior frontal gyrus (pars opercularis)
assigned to Area 44, probability: 60%
R 31 50 8 20 5.22
Precentral gyrus assigned to Area 6,
probability: 50%
L 38 −28 −14 60 5.96
Precentral gyrus assigned to Area 6,
probability: 70%
R 6 24 −12 64 4.95
Postcentral gyrus assigned to Area 2,
probability: 50%
L 900 −36 −40 56 >8
Postcentral gyrus assigned to Area 2,
probability: 50%
R 1595 58 −22 44 >8
Supramarginal gyrus assigned to
IPC (PFt), probability: 60%
L 900 −54 −26 36 >8
Supramarginal gyrus assigned to
IPC (PFcm), probability: 50%
R 1595 54 −30 28 >8
Superior temporal gyrus L 77 −52 −14 0 5.96
Middle temporal gyrus assigned to
hOC5 (V5), probability: 50%
R 541 48 −66 0 >8
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Table 2. (continued)
A. Main Effect of Modality
Region Hem
(LCInt + LPhC) > (XLCInt + XLPhC) (XLCInt + XLPhC) > (LCInt + LPhC)
k x y z Z k x y z Z
Inferior occipital gyrus assigned to
hOC5 (V5), probability: 10%
L 252 −48 −76 −4 >8
Middle cingulate cortex assigned to
SPL (5Ci), probability: 30%
R 24 4 −30 40 5.28
Caudate nucleus L 28 −12 18 −4 5.65
R 55 16 22 −4 6.03
B. Conjunction of the Two Simple Main Effects of Modality
Region Hem
(LCInt−XLCInt) conj. (LPhC−XLPhC):
L > XL
(XLCInt-LCInt) conj. (XLPhC− LPhC):
XL > L
k x y z Z k x y z Z
Inferior frontal gyrus (pars opercularis)
assigned to Area 44, probability: 30%
L 18 −44 12 24 5.57
Precentral gyrus assigned to Area 6,
probability: 40%
L 11 −50 −8 44 5.34
Middle temporal gyrus L 500 −60 −4 −12 >8
R 36 66 −8 −16 6.11
Temporal pole L 500 −46 18 −28 5.97
Superior occipital gyrus assigned to
Area 17, probability: 20%
L 2 −16 −94 12 4.81
Lingual gyrus assigned to Area
hOC3v (V3v), probability: 50%
L 21 −14 −90 −12 6.35
Cerebellum L 26 −36 −40 −28 6.02
Postcentral gyrus assigned to Area 2,
probability: 50%
L 66 −28 −44 56 5.7
Postcentral gyrus assigned to Area 2,
Probability: 90%
R 123 36 −40 52 6.72
Supramarginal gyrus assigned to
IPC (PF), probability: 60%
L 58 −62 −28 32 5.78
Supramarginal gyrus assigned to
IPC (PFcm), probability: 50%
R 179 54 −30 28 6.68
Superior parietal lobule assigned to
SPL (7PC), probability: 50%
R 4 28 −50 60 4.93
Inferior temporal gyrus assigned to
hOC5 (V5), probability: 20%
R 137 50 −68 −4 6.69
Inferior occipital gyrus assigned to
hOC5 (V5), probability: 20%
L 83 −48 −74 −4 7.04
Caudate nucleus R 3 18 20 −4 5.05
For each activated brain region, we report whether the left (L) or right (R) hemisphere was activated (Hem), cluster size (k), Montreal Neurological
Institute space coordinates in millimeters (x,y,z), and Z score (Z ). LCInt = linguistic communicative intention; XLCInt = extralinguistic communicative
intention; LPhC = linguistic physical causality; XLPhC = extralinguistic physical causality. Where available, we report the name of the anatomical regions
the cytoarchitectonic labels and probabilities according to the SPM Anatomy Toolbox (www.fz-juelich.de/ime/spm_anatomy_toolbox).
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independently of the type of task (intentional vs. noninten-
tional) were comparable with those of the main effect of
Modality (Table 2B).
Interaction Effect of Factors: Intention × Modality
The Intention×Modality interaction effect, that is, (LCInt−
LPhC) − (XLCInt − XLPhC) yielded significant activa-
tions in the left superior occipital gyrus (BA 17) and in
the right cuneus (BA 18). By inspecting the directionality
of the estimates for each of the four experimental condi-
tions, we could conclude that the interaction effects in
both brain regions were driven by a selective signal in-
crease for the LCInt condition (Table 3 and Figure 2C).
In other words, these brain regions were selectively modu-
lated by the processing of the intentional task, but only
within a linguistic and not within an extralinguistic con-
text. No other interaction effects were found. Thus, it
can be concluded that there were no specific effects
for the XLCInt, LPhC, and XLPhC conditions over and
beyond those shared with the other experimental condi-
tions, that is, when these were grouped either by inten-
tionality (main effect of Intention) or by Modality (main
effect of modality).
DISCUSSION
The present study aimed to analyze the brain responses
involved in communicative intention processing. Even if
the neural bases of human communication have been
widely investigated for different aspects of the linguistic
encoding process, including the syntactic and the seman-
tic levels (Bookheimer, 2002; Kaan & Swaab, 2002), few
studies had the level at which a communicative intention
is inferred and comprehended within a specific social
context, that is, the pragmatic level, as their main focus.
Furthermore, no studies have until now directly compared
the comprehension of the same communicative intention
generated, in the same context, through linguistic means
versus extralinguistic gestural means (for a different and in-
teresting approach to the relationship between language
and communication, see Willems et al., 2010).
Figure 3. Cytoarchitectonic
probability of activations in
BA 44. Areas of activation
( p < .05, FWE corrected) in
the pars opercularis of the
inferior frontal gyri specific
for the linguistic modality
(green color scale) and for
the extralinguistic modality
(yellow color scale) are
displayed on axial slices of
the anatomical image of one
of the participants (z coordinate
levels in mm). The areas of
activation are superimposed
on cytoarchitectonic probability
maps (dark blue–light cyan
color, according to %
probability) for BA 44
(Amunts et al., 1999).
Table 3. Activations at p < .05, FWE Corrected for Multiple Comparisons
Interaction Intention × Modality
Hem
(LCInt − XLCInt) > (LPhC − XLPhC)
Direction of EffectRegion k x y z Z
Superior occipital gyrus assigned
to Area 17, probability: 60%
L 108 −8 −100 12 7.51 LCInt > (XLCInt, LPhC, XLPhC)
Cuneus assigned to Area 18,
probability: 60%
R 62 10 −96 16 7.63 LCInt > (XLCInt, LPhC, XLPhC)
For each activated brain region, we report whether the left (L) or the right (R) hemisphere was activated (Hem), cluster size (k), Montreal Neuro-
logical Institute space coordinates in millimeters (x,y,z), Z score (Z ), and the direction of the effects for the different interaction terms. LCInt =
linguistic communicative intention; XLCInt = extralinguistic communicative intention; LPhC = linguistic physical causality; XLPhC = extralinguistic
physical causality. Where available, we report the name of the anatomical regions the cytoarchitectonic labels and probabilities according to the SPM
Anatomy Toolbox (www.fz-juelich.de/ime/spm_anatomy_toolbox).
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Our results clearly showed that a common neural net-
work is engaged in communicative intention processing
independently of the modality used. Moreover, we found
two additional brain networks that were specifically re-
cruited depending on the modality used, that is, a peri-
sylvian language network for the linguistic modality and a
sensorimotor network for the extralinguistic modality.
Communicative Intention Processing
The first issue we wished to address was whether the
brain areas involved in the IPN, that is, the right and left
pSTS, the right and left TPJ, the precuneus, and the
MPFC, are commonly recruited regardless of the modal-
ity used to convey a communicative intention.
The main effect of Intention of the present study (in-
tentional vs. nonintentional conditions) showed that
communicative intention stimuli elicited higher activa-
tion in the brain areas belonging to the IPN compared
with the nonintentional stimuli. A conjunction between
the two simple main effects of Intention shows that these
areas are recruited by both the LCInt and the XLCInt con-
ditions. Thus, IPN activation may be considered as mod-
ality independent. Furthermore, we also demonstrated,
on the basis of a specific a priori experimental hypoth-
esis, that the anatomical location of the right and left
pSTS, right and left TPJ, precuneus, and MPFC activations
found in the present study closely overlap with the loca-
tion of the IPN activations found in Walter et al. (2004).
These results clearly demonstrate that intention process-
ing within a communicative context is independent of
the communicative means through which the communi-
cative intention is conveyed and shared.
Distinct from other kinds of intention, that is, individ-
ual intentions, communicative intention possesses an
intrinsically recursive nature: Sharing a communicative
intention with a partner means sharing the intention to
communicate a meaning to someone else plus intending
that the former intention is recognized by the addressee.
In the previous studies (Walter et al., 2009; Ciaramidaro
et al., 2007; Walter et al., 2004), we found that while the
processing of individual intentions recruits only the pre-
cuneus and the right TPJ, the processing of communica-
tive intentions also recruits the left TPJ and the MPFC.
Recent meta-analyses have provided convergent evidence
for the role of these brain areas in intention processing
(Van Overwalle, 2009; Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009).
These works described the precuneus as crucial for the
elaboration of contextual information and for the identifi-
cation of the situational structure and the TPJ as involved
during the identification of the end state of behaviors. In
particular, the TPJ along with the precuneus and the MPFC
takes part in a larger process of goal identification in a so-
cial context. As regards theMPFC, VanOverwalle (2009) em-
phasized the impressive amount and consistency of the
empirical evidence concerning the engagement of this
area in social inferences. Interestingly, the MPFC seems
to play a crucial role in understanding social scripts that do
not concern a single actor but that describe adequate social
actions for all the actors involved in a particular social
context.
The kind of communicative intention processing herein
explored falls within the general domain of intention pro-
cessing in social cognition, that is, what Frith and Frith
(2006) called the “what happened next” in a social context.
Van Overwalle and Baetens (2009) discussed which brain
areas are responsible for understanding the actions of
others and their underlying goals. The authors proposed
a model that ordered actions and goals hierarchically
according to their level of abstractness, discriminating
between immediate goals that reflect the understanding
of basic actions and long-term intentions that reflect the
“why” of an action in a social context. The results of their
meta-analysis provided additional evidence consistent with
the role of the IPN investigated here: Although the under-
standing of basic actions requires the mirror neuron sys-
tem, the understanding of social actions requires the
concurrent activation of the pSTS and TPJ areas as well
as the precuneus and the MPFC.
Several studies have investigated the reciprocal influences
and the cross-modal interactions between speech and em-
blem gestures (Barbieri, Buonocore, Volta, & Gentilucci,
2009; Kircher et al., 2009; Xu, Gannon, Emmorey, Smith,
& Braun, 2009; Bernardis & Gentilucci, 2006; Gunter &
Bach, 2004; Nakamura et al., 2004). These studies have
shown that the integration between meaningful gestures
and speech occurs at a high semantic level and that the com-
bination of both expressive means leads to effects that are
not simply a linear combination of perceiving either em-
blems or speech alone (Barbieri et al., 2009; Bernardis &
Gentilucci, 2006; Gentilucci, Bernardis, Crisi, & Dalla Volta,
2006). On the whole, the prevailing view in the litera-
ture is that speech and gesture share a unified decoding
process at the semantic level. To the best of our knowl-
edge, no previous studies have addressed the question
of common processes for speech and gestures at the
pragmatic level, such as in communicative intention pro-
cessing. In this respect, we propose that linguistic and
gestural modalities could share a common communicative
competence also at the level at which an actorʼs commu-
nicative intention has to be reconstructed by a partner.
Communicative Modalities
The second issue we wished to address was whether any
additional brain areas other than those involved at the
pragmatic level, that is, the IPN areas, are specifically re-
cruited depending on the modality used.
An open question in the literature concerns the role of
expressive modalities in communication (e.g., Willems
& Hagoort, 2007; Bates & Dick, 2002; Goldin-Meadow,
1999). As highlighted by recent works that analyzed the
interaction of linguistic and gestural communicative mo-
dalities (see previous section), two competing views are
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debated regarding the relationship between gesture and
speech. One view postulates that gesture and speech are
controlled by twodifferent communication systems (Krauss
& Hadar, 1999; Hadar, Wenkert-Olenik, & Soroker, 1998;
Petitto, 1987; Levelt, Richardson, & La Heij, 1985), whereas
the other view (Bara, 2010; Tomasello, 2008; Fadiga &
Craighero, 2006; Kendon, 2004; McNeill, 1992) postulates
that gesture and speech form a single system of communi-
cation because they are linked to the same mental pro-
cesses despite differing in expression modality.
These competing views seem to be at least partially
reconciled by recent neuroimaging evidence. In an fMRI
study, Xu et al. (2009) showed their participantsʼ video
clips featuring a single person performing symbolic ges-
tures, such as emblems, and the corresponding spoken
glosses conveying the same semantic content. They found
that communicative symbolic gestures and the corre-
sponding spoken glosses, although activating distinct
modality-specific areas in the inferior and superior tem-
poral cortices respectively, both engaged to the same ex-
tent the left inferior frontal cortex and the posterior
temporal cortex bilaterally. These results speak for a
shared semantic representation, which may be accessed
by distinct modality-specific sensory gateways, according
to the linguistic or gestural format of the input.
On the basis of a different task showing communicative
interactions featuring two persons, our results may also be
viewed as a possible reconciliation, at the pragmatic level,
of the two previously mentioned opposite views. Thus, al-
though Xu et al. (2009) suggested that the anterior and
the posterior peri-sylvian areas may function as a modality-
independent semantic network linking meaning with
symbols (both words and gestures), our data suggest that
the right and left pSTS, right and left TPJ, precuneus, and
MPFC may function as a modality-independent intention-
ality network, linking meaning with the communicative
intention the actor is pursuing with that meaning.
This common representation of communicative inten-
tion may then be accessed by modality-specific gateways,
which are distinct for linguistic versus extralinguistic ex-
pressive means. Here, the two networks constituting the
modality-specific gateways do not just reflect the type of
sensory input (written vs. iconic), but very much also the
higher order cognitive versus sensorimotor neural pro-
cesses for the integration of such sensory inputs. As a mat-
ter of fact, discerning the meaning of a communicative
action requires more than just comprehending the mean-
ing of the words or gestures: It also requires the capacity
to represent other peopleʼs mental states underlying a so-
cial action. Hence, the main effect of modality demon-
strated that compared with stimuli in the extralinguistic
modality, stimuli in the linguistic modality elicited higher
activations in classical language areas, including the left
peri-sylvian fronto-temporal cortex, extending into the
contralateral right anterior middle temporal cortex. Vice
versa, stimuli in the extralinguistic modality specifically elic-
ited higher activations in sensorimotor and premotor
areas, bilaterally, and also bilaterally in area V5, coding
for biological movement (Malikovic et al., 2007).
A debated question concerning classical language areas
is the role of Brocaʼs area in linguistic and extralinguistic
dimensions. Our data showed an interesting modality-
specific activation pattern in the pars opercularis of the
left inferior frontal cortex, with additional bilateral activa-
tion, in the left hemisphere for linguistic, and in the right
hemisphere for extralinguistic stimuli (Figure 3). This sym-
metrical activation pattern in BA 44 is remindful of some
evidence provided by previous neuroimaging studies that
contrasted the processing of linguistic versus extralinguis-
tic (although not specifically of a gestural kind) stimuli. In
particular, a study by Tettamanti et al. (2002) showed that
the acquisition of novel syntactic rules reflecting universal
linguistic principles selectively activates several left peri-
sylvian regions, including Brocaʼs area pars opercularis
(BA 44), compared with syntactic rules following nonlin-
guistic principles (i.e., violating linguistic universals). In
turn, the right homologous of Brocaʼs area was activated
by both linguistic and nonlinguistic rules if compared with
a cognitive baseline and more by nonlinguistic than by
linguistic rules in the direct comparison. These original
findings have been confirmed by other neuroimaging
studies, with variations of both the grammatical rules of
reference (Musso et al., 2003) and the cognitive domain
(Tettamanti et al., 2009). However, it must be noted that
whereas the preferential activation of the left BA 44 for
linguistic versus nonlinguistic syntactic rules has been
consistently reported in a number of further studies
(e.g., Bahlmann, Schubotz, Mueller, Koester, & Friederici,
2009; Bahlmann, Schubotz, & Friederici, 2008; Friederici,
Bahlmann, Heim, Schubotz, & Anwander, 2006; Hoen,
Pachot-Clouard, Segebarth, & Dominey, 2006), the prefer-
ential activation of the right BA 44 for nonlinguistic versus
linguistic rules has either not been found or not been
investigated.
If the involvement of the right homologous region
of Brocaʼs area pars opercularis is to be seen as part of
the cognitive processing network for extralinguistically
structured sequences of symbols and, with respect to
the present work, more specifically also for symbolic com-
municative gestures, we should expect to find the right
BA 44 to be consistently involved in hand action and ges-
ture processing. This is indeed the case for the observation
of hand actions (e.g., Buccino et al., 2001), especially in
relation to their outcome (Hamilton & Grafton, 2008;
Schubotz & von Cramon, 2004). Generally, the left ventral
premotor BA 6/44 complex is also involved in these task,
but the lack of a formal comparison with corresponding
linguistic conditions, as we have performed here, does
not allow the question of hemispheric dominance for
the two modalities to be tackled. Interestingly, recent stud-
ies (Dick, Goldin-Meadow, Hasson, Skipper, & Small,
2009; Green et al., 2009; Straube, Green, Weis, Chatterjee,
& Kircher, 2009) found that the right inferior frontal gyrus
displayed more activity when hand movements were
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semantically unrelated than when they were related to the
accompanying speech. Altogether, these findings may be
compatible with the results of our study, in which the par-
ticipants were required to choose a compatible outcome
for the intention revealed by the extralinguistic communi-
cative gesture, and discard the noncompatible outcome.
Interaction between Communicative Intention
Processing and Communicative Modalities
Finally, a crucial question is whether communicative inten-
tions are processed differently in the linguistic and the ex-
tralinguistic modalities. An answer to this question was
provided by our analysis of Intention × Modality interac-
tion, which showed that the interaction effects were limited
to two bilateral occipital activations (BA 17 and BA 18), that
is, outside both the core peri-sylvian language network
activated by linguistic stimuli and the sensorimotor net-
work activated by extralinguistic stimuli. Interestingly, these
interactions in the occipital cortex were mainly driven by
a selective signal increase for the LCInt condition.
As we had no a priori hypothesis about the interaction
effects, the interpretation of this finding can only be spec-
ulative. The activation involved associative and early visual
cortices. One hypothesis is that the linguistic condition
required an additional engagement of visual imagery pro-
cesses (Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001) to represent
the visual scene required for the understanding of com-
municative intentions. In addition, it is noteworthy that
the occipital cortex is typically involved by ToM tasks. A
systematic quantitative meta-analysis of ToM studies has
been recently reported by Spreng, Mar, and Kim (2009).
Using the activation likelihood estimation approach to
analyze 30 ToM neuroimaging studies, the authors found
the occipital cortices to be part of the ToM core network.
The activation of regions early in the visual stream during
ToM tasks has been related to the analysis of visual-kinetic
information about intention to act, a crucial component of
the perception of animacy (Castelli, Happé, Frith, & Frith,
2000). The directionality of the interaction effects in the
bilateral occipital cortex [LCInt > (XLCInt, LPhC, XLPhC)]
may be thus the result of the additional mental imagery
processes required by the LCInt condition. In LCInt, a
sentence in written form replaced the depiction of a com-
municative interaction between the two agents, and this
may have induced the experimental subjects to represent
through mental imagery the modifications of the visual
scene implied by the message. This process may also imply
an increase in attentional focus on the details of the picture,
which is not required by the extralinguistic task. This may
result in an enhancement of occipital activation (Kastner,
Pinsk, De Weerd, Desimone, & Ungerleider, 1999).
Physical Causality Processing
Unlike in other species, human cognition is formed by the
ability to comprehend external events in terms of inten-
tional or causal mediated forces to explain human or physi-
cal observed behaviors, that is, intentional relations between
agents or causal relations between objects, and also to pre-
dict their outcomes (Tomasello, 1999; Humphrey, 1976).
The present work was not mainly concerned with the
clarification of the neural correlates underlying the pro-
cessing of PhC conditions, which, following the same ap-
proach as in our previous study (Walter et al., 2004), was
treated as a matched control condition within a cognitive
subtraction logic. Accordingly, no specific a priori hypoth-
eses on the neural correlates of the PhC conditions have
been specified. Here we shall only briefly point out that
the activation pattern emerging from the main effect of In-
tention (PhC > CInt) appears to be compatible with the
view that the PhC task engaged attentional and predictive
neural processes necessary for the understanding of causal
relations between physical objects. In particular, the task
presumably engaged visual, spatial, and attentional pro-
cessing, as indicated by the presence of bilateral activa-
tions in the posterior extrastriate cortex, in the fusiform
gyri, in the superior parietal lobules, in the supramarginal
gyri, in the superior frontal gyri (corresponding to the
anatomical location of the FEFs), and in the lateral pFC
(see, e.g., Egner et al., 2008). Additional activations were
found particularly in the inferior frontal gyri, bilaterally,
corresponding to BA 44, which may be crucial, as already
discussed earlier (Hamilton & Grafton, 2008; Schubotz
& von Cramon, 2004), for the prediction of the outcome
of the physical event either described in written form or
depicted.
Conclusions
Human communicative competence is based on the ability
to process a specific class of mental states, namely, com-
municative intention. Communicative intention represents
the primary mental state to be dealt with in explaining
other peopleʼs communicative actions. Although we may
speak of a single agent when we refer to actions in general,
when we enter the domain of communication we must al-
ways refer to at least one actor and a partner to whom the
act is directed. For this reason, the present study ex-
amined a full communicative exchange, that is, a commu-
nicative action proposed by an actor and the concurrent
reaction to that action by a partner.
Our findings demonstrate that a common brain network
is recruited for the comprehension of communicative in-
tention, independent of the modality through which it is
conveyed. This common brain network, the IPN, includes
the precuneus, the left and right pSTS and TPJ, and the
MPFC. Additional brain areas outside those involved in in-
tention processing are specifically engaged by the particu-
lar communicative modality, most likely reflecting distinct
modality-specific sensory gateways to the IPN. Peri-sylvian
language areas are recruited by the linguistic modality,
whereas sensorimotor and premotor areas are recruited
by the extralinguistic modality.
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Taken together, our results indicate that the informa-
tion acquired by different communicative modalities is
equivalent from a mental processing standpoint, in par-
ticular, at the point at which the actorʼs communicative
intention has to be reconstructed. Thus, communicative
intention processing may build on such different sources
of information as language and gestures to infer the under-
lying intended meaning.
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